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If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It* **
Dimitar Chobanov
1st of July is the date when we celebrate 10 years
from the beginning of the most successful
reform which have been undertaken in the field
of economic policy after the transformation of
the Bulgarian economy. The introduction of the
currency board put an end of the uncontrollable
increase in the money supply, which is a
significant premise for the stabilization of the
Bulgarian lev and the confidence in it.
The high and stable economic growth is
determined by the existence of individual liberty
and personal responsibility. The different
elements are connected with voluntary
exchange, the protection of property rights and
the rule of the law, low taxes, free movement of
capital and people, and last but not least - stable
money. The reforms which have been conducted
during the last 10 years and which have
contributed for increase in the economic
freedom, have improved the conditions for
individual initiative and accelerated
development. The biggest advancement has been
realized exactly in the sphere of money due to
the implementation of the currency board.
The currency board has been introduced in
Bulgaria after a severe financial crisis, which
started in the beginning of the 1990s and reached
its peak in 1996 and first months of 1997. The
results were disastrous- significantly lower real
income, the pensions got as low as USD 2 per
month, and some wages - USD 3 per month.
People used the lev to a lesser and lesser degree.
It was substituted with the US dollar and the
German mark not only for savings, but also for
everyday payments in the shops. In some cases
even natural exchange was implemented
meaning that the lev did not perform its
functions as money. Other negative peculiarities
of this period are the real decrease in investment,
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the pouring out of capital, the chronic budget
deficit, and the enormous public debt. The
overall expenses for the economy from the crisis
are 40% of the GDP for that period, classifying
the crisis as one of the most sizeable in Central
and Eastern Europe.
During the period 1991-1997 the Bulgarian
National Bank implemented discretionary
monetary policy, meaning a policy without clear
principles. The set-down quantitative goals were
not publicly known, or if the goals had become
known, they were not achieved. Besides BNB
was strongly dependent on the government and
took into consideration its policy toward the
budget deficit and the financing of the
unprofitable state enterprises. Additionally, at
the time of the peak of the crisis, the creditor of
the last resort was not only the BNB but the one
of the state owned banks, DSK, which undertook
a great deal of the refinancing of the commercial
banks.
The existence of a currency board presumes the
complete termination of such practices because
it requires the maintenance of firm financial
discipline in the private and public sectors. The
ability for BNB to be a creditor of last resort is
severely limited only to cases of liquidity risk
for the whole bank system. The central bank is
forbidden to lend money to the government
(with the exception for credits from the
International Monetary Fund, which have to go
through BNB before becoming available for the
government, but this does not pose a violation of
the essence of the currency board).
The Bulgarian lev is pegged to the Euro and the
BNB is required to maintain a minimum of
100% coverage to the monetary base (including
the fiscal reserve account at Issue Department
which functions as a currency board) with assets
denominated in euro. The full coverage of the
monetary base and the requirement for BNB to
exchange levs for euros upon demand ensures
the convertibility of the local currency and
increases its stability. In this sense the monetary
emission is entirely subject to the market
demand and BNB cannot discretionary increase
the money supply.
The governments, being deprived of the ability
to issue money and thus finance their
expenditures, are forced to keep their budgets
balanced after 1997, and in the last 3 years
significant budget surpluses have been realized.
As a result the inflation pressure is going down,
and its negative consequences are under control.
The Bulgarian lev stands stable relative to the
goods and services that can be bought with it,
and relative to the other currencies as well. It
functions as a measure of the prices and allows
the comparison between them. Besides, the
stable lev results in higher credibility in the
economy, reducing the expenses for hedging
against sharp changes in the price level. Thus the
resources are allocated more efficiently,
investment is increased, capital is accumulated,
and the economic growth is enhanced.
Of course, the currency board has its opponents
who claim that as a result of its functioning a
current account deficit emerged. They argue in
favor of depreciation of the lev or a complete
removal of the board. The consequences of such
a decision would be strongly negative for the
economy as a whole and would mean a
reduction of real income for the employees
because the prices of raw materials and
technology will not go down for the reason that
they are imported and paid in foreign currency.
In the long-run due to higher inflation the real
return from investment will be lower which will
result in outflow of foreign investment and
lower real growth of productivity. Therefore, the
applicability of such measure is not only
undesirable but also detrimental.
The results from the introduction of the currency
board and the rest of the reforms such as
privatization, the liberalization of trade and the
movement of capital during the period 1998-
2006 are presented in the table below. The
improvements are result from more prudent
policy and give grounds to conclude that the
expansion of individual freedom is the proper
way. The policy of the ruling parties should be
built on this way if the goal is higher economic
growth and standard of living.
A very important element of this policy is the
maintenance of the currency board and the
exchange rate toward the euro until its
introduction as a legal tender. This will
guarantee the preservation of the already
achieved stability in the economy and will
continue to contribute for its positive
development. Any change in the monetary
regime is absolutely ungrounded, would result in
destabilization and redistribution of income in
favor of definite small groups in the society at
the expense of everybody else. This is the reason
why the reasonable and responsible politicians
should firm support the currency board.
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Table: Some economic indicators (average for the period)
Indicators 1991-1997 1998-2006
Inflation rate (%) 198.3 7.2
GDP growth (%) -4.7 4.9
Growth of investment (%) -8.8 18.8
Budget balance (% of GDP) -6.3 0.9
Public debt (% of GDP) 168 57
Foreign direct investment (millions of USD) 141 1991
Foreign direct investment (% of GDP) 1.7 10
Source: BNB, NSI, Ministry of Finance and own calculations
*Citation by Burt Lance
**The article is first published in “Capital” newspaper
Power without Control
Svetla Kostadinova
The chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament
announced the report on its activities in July
2007. According to it, since current Parliament
inauguration:
-  293 plenary sessions were held
-  391 acts were passed
- 2 Constitutional amendments were adopted
- 5 codes were voted
- 1 360 questions and 579 interpellations to
council of ministers were made.
The statistics itself is impressive. A reasonable
person will think whether he had noticed the
effects of such legislative activity. Assessments
would vary.
On one side, there are certain groups in the
society that would claim Parliament work is
efficient and useful. These are businesses and
professions that managed to enforce their will
and interests which is not bad if the society
benefits. This is not always the case however.
Numerous examples of laws that hinder public
interest, create preferences and limit competition
can be found in the list.
On the other side, the European Commission
would be happy about certain aspects of
Parliament work. According to the report, 243
new acts were adopted that are closely related to
imposition and harmonization of EU legislation.
This is approximately 62% of all legislation
which means that either there was unfinished
business, the Bulgarian MPs are
“harmonizators” or just using EU as justification
for pointless work – no one can claim that there
is a single person who can quickly and
successfully orient in so many laws. Another
issue is that Bulgarian lawmakers almost always
overdo in transposition and often European
Commission would reject its authorship in some
acts adopted by Bulgarian Parliament.
The most important issue, however, is the
impact on society from lawmaking activity. It’s
hard to answer to this question. In USA, each
year the Office of management and budget
within the President prepares review of the
effects of federal regulations with significant
impact on society. Draft report 2007 states that
the benefits from regulations are between 99
billion and 484 billion dollars; the costs are
between 44 billion and 46 billion dollars; the
average annual compliance costs have decreased
by 47% for the last twenty years and average
annual benefits have doubled for the last 8 years.
Unlike USA, here in Bulgaria we can not expect
such analysis and the reason is very simple – no
one in our “very busy” Parliament does not
know exactly the effects from certain regulations
would be during the discussions, after law
adoption or several years after it has been
implemented. It appears that Bulgarian MPs
don’t care or just don’t know whether a law
makes sense in first place.
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria
Economic Policy Review, issue 52, July 2007
4
Another question is how and whether the voted
laws will be implemented in practice. One can
argue that is not of concern for the Parliament
but this is the institution that should exercise
control otherwise its activities are meaningless.
An important aspect is lack of review of
regulations’ effects after they have been
implemented in practice. It is normal to have
different from expected effects and therefore a
revision of results is recommended so the law
can be fixed accordingly. The other issue of the
problem is that some of the provisions in the
newly voted laws are underfinanced – according
to recently released information there are
activities stipulated in legislation that lack more
than 2 billion leva (1 billion Euro) of financing.
Finally, the Parliament itself has the obligation
to approve annual budgets and reports of various
state bodies and agencies but it has not done this
regularly for years which is a total lack of
control over executive power in the country.
The effects are:
1) Despite the lack of total calculation of
effects from legislative work, is it more
likely that there are more costs than
benefits unless someone show us any
analysis stating the opposite;
2) “Bad” laws are just not enforced in
practice that imposes more costs – for
the business to hide and not comply, and
for administration – to monitor and
administer;
3) The power given to MPs is hard to be
monitored and assessed – if we don’t
know the real effects from lawmaking
we can not search for responsibility;
4) In this situation certain groups have
clear privilege and access that can be
used in their favor.
The major conclusion is that because it is
impossible to judge what in practice the
Parliament does, people will vote unexpectedly
during elections. This in turn is advantageously
for big parties because they hope that they will
always manage to position “their people” in the
next Parliament. That’s why they don’t accept
more transparency in legislative activity now.
New Economic Order
Veliko Dimitrov
Petar Dimitrov has already made a vow and is
the new minister of the economy and energy. If,
as it is stated, he will follow the policies of
Rumen Ovcharov, then why was it necessary to
have a new minister. Away from this, if the
management of the economic ministry and the
conduct of its policy do not supply grounds for a
change, then the question is entirely political and
the (un)realized results have not mattered much.
Judging from the media appearance of the new
minister, few interesting ideas immediately draw
the attention: the establishment of a bank for
development, change in the policy of the
regulatory regimes, attraction of foreign
investments from ‘a new kind’ and increase of
the personal income.
In Dimitrov’s opinion, a Bulgarian bank for
development should be established as soon as
possible, which will credit the export, which will
lead to decrease in the current account deficit.
When discussing the idea for the creation of
such a bank, two very important issues should be
considered.
First, the model for economic growth in
Bulgaria, to be differentiated from that of the
Asian countries, which was export-oriented, is
based on the attraction of foreign investment. To
a great degree this is the reason for the existence
of the deficit- the greater the amount of
investment, the greater the amount of the deficit.
An alternative and surely more successful way
for restraining the deficit is to bring to a stop the
foreign direct investment- veto for investing in
Bulgaria, currency constraints, higher taxes, etc.
Second, but not less important, is the fact that
after all somebody should pay for this. More
advantageous credits may exist if somebody
pays for the differential between the market
interest and the interest for the export credits.
For example, if the new bank gives loans
applying 5% interest on yearly basis, and the
bank does not want to go bankrupt, it has to
accumulate resources from the depositor given
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interest lower than 5%(for easiness of
computation let’s suppose that the fees for
different operations cover the expenses of the
bank). But who will agree to lend his money for
interest lower than 5%, which may not even
cover the yearly inflation rate? The answer is –
probably nobody. Therefore, for the idea to
become reality, budget financing should be
ensured. As it has happened many times so far,
because of the intellectual exhaustion of the
Socialists, again everybody will pay, but only a
small group will benefit at the expenses of
everyone else.
Besides all this it should be noted that such a
national bank actually exists- Encouragement
Bank – but instead of decreasing, the deficit
actually increases. The establishment of a
second bank like the already existent would
hardly place Bulgaria among the leading
exporters. One thing is for sure- the price the
taxpayers will pay, will be huge.
As far as the regulatory regimes are concerned,
nothing good seems to be coming-they would
not be removed, reduced or facilitated. They
would just be “tilted toward the employers’
organizations”. This would signify that the entry
barriers would be removed from the state, upon
whose activities some control can be exerted
still, to national and regional associations,
chambers, and organizations, which absolutely
unbothered (especially on local level) will have
the right to give or refuse entry ticket to
whomever they please. The transfer of
regulatory rights away from the state to private
organizations has the potential to become a
bigger obstacle for the new business.
The attraction of investors of ‘a new kind’ is
another interesting idea, behind which
corruption, “friendly firms” and discrimination
are easy to be noticed. Every investor chooses
where to go, basing his decision on particular
parameters for the country, the field, etc. Given
that Petar Dimitrov cannot change the existing
macroeconomic or sector indicators, he should
promise particular preferential treatment to
‘strategic’ and ‘clean’ investors, in order to
compensate for the lack of better general
conditions. This for sure will create inequality
between competing companies (those with and
without concessions) and as a whole the
negative effects will be more. On the other side,
the new minister, even though stating he is a
‘corporate orphan’, obviously has the goal in his
ministry to decide who is good – better – best.
How exactly…it is not yet clear.
And the last one from the new old ideas –
increase of the personal income. If mister
Dimitrov had in mind the incomes of particular
groups employed in the public sector – it is
already known how they could be increased,
who will pay and what the result will be (the
protests of all the rest who have been missed).
On the other side, if the new minister meant
absolutely everybody, he has to keep his vague
allusions that the reduction of taxes and social
security contributions are possible and can be
put into effect. Well, let’s hope not to wait for
too long because there are only two years left.
Centralized Indexing Of The Wages In The
Private Sector – Does It Make Sense?
Adriana Mladenova
After several weeks of negotiations, the labour
unions and organizations of employer
representatives reached a consensus on the
recommended rate of indexing of the wages in
the private sector. The labour unions first
insisted on a rate above 18%, while the
employers offered 9.6%. At last, as anticipated,
a compromise solution was reached at 12.9%.
However, it is important to make the following
explanation about the index:
1) It is only recommended, not a
mandatory for the private sector;
2) Similar indices will be prepared on a
sector level as well. Both of the
negotiating parties agree that this
percentage does not correspond to the
specific characteristics in many sectors
of the economy.
Perhaps, many people that work in the private
sector, wonder why the media in Bulgaria put
such a stress on these negotiations and whether it
has anything to do with them. And they have
right. In the private sector, it is the negotiations
between each individual and its employer that
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matter, not the decisions of any third parties. The
wages are set on individual level, through
mutual agreement.
It is true that the factors, that have impact on the
businessmen’s decisions to pay for labour
depend on the behavior of the other participants
in the market – on their competitors, stage of
development in the sector, as well as on the
macroeconomic situation and the dynamics on
the labour market. But it is certain that the
economic actors in the private sector do not need
to be either reminded, or convinced that they
should pay attention to the market signals and to
change their strategies accordingly. All attempts
that have been made by government to impose
its centralized decisions on individuals,
contradict to the logics of the free market. It is
the individual actors that serve as a conductor of
the market signals by which people coordinate
and equilibrium is reached in the economy
between demand and supply.
The formula, by which the rate of 12.9% has
been calculated, is nothing more than just a mere
arithmetic calculation, without economic
reasoning behind it. The index is a sum of the
inflation rate for the previous year, 75% of the
increase rate in the productivity of labour, and
weighted-average parameters that are supposed
to reflect the competitiveness and the market
situation in the country. There is not, and there
cannot be, logical justification of the weights in
the formula and the usage of historical aggregate
data, that does not carry information about the
future, or the true perceptions of the economic
actors. The same result could be achieved
through arithmetic calculation using random
numbers.
The wages in the private sector do depend on the
inflation and the productivity of labour, on the
quality and quantity of labour force and the
expectations of the entrepreneurs about the
development of the market. However, the
proposed formula reverses cause and effect. The
productivity of labour increases in these
companies, where the managers invest in
physical capital and new technologies, in
training of their employees and managing more
efficiently the resources.  However, if firms raise
wages and thus, increase costs, this may deprive
them of the chance to make any other
investments, which may enhance the
productivity in labour in the long run.
The pressure by the labour unions for increasing
of wages in the public sector, and for minimum
indexing of the wages in the private sector can
only be of harm for the workers. The increase of
the salaries of drivers working for the public
transportation company, served as a catalyst for
such demands by other groups in the public
sphere. Higher wages, without economic
reasons, cannot improve the standard of living in
the country as a whole, just vice-versa.
This is what meant the finance minister Plamen
Oresharski by saying that, even if wages do rise
in nominal terms, their true purchasing power
may decrease. If requests, which have been sent
to the Ministry of Finance for increase of wages
in the public sector are accepted, which by now
account for 1.2 billion leva, a crises similar to
that in 1997 may occur (when there was a
hyperinflation in the country and massive
bankruptcy of banks due to printing of money
and loose monetary policy).
Employers in the private sectors do not need to
be taught how to index the wages of their
workers. In the private market, legitimate are
these decisions that are taken by mutual consent
between the two parties. Therefore, employees
should not rely on the government or someone
else to negotiate the terms of the working
conditions for them, but to defend their own
interests.
Flat Earth!
Petar Ganev
?It is very fortunate that I was not an economist.
I had read only one book on economics ? Milton
Friedman?s ?Free to Choose?. I was so
ignorant at the time that I thought that what
Friedman wrote about the benefits of
privatization, the flat tax and the abolition of all
customs rights, was the result of economic
reforms that had been put into practice in the
West. It seemed common sense to me and, as I
thought it had already been done everywhere, I
simply introduced it in Estonia, despite warnings
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from Estonian economists that it could not be
done. They said it was as impossible as walking
on water. We did it: we just walked on the water
because we did not know that it was
impossible.?
Mart Laar, 2006
Flat Tax reform is getting more and more
popular. Estonia was the first country in Europe
to introduce the flat tax in 1994 and now 13
years later, the flat tax has been introduced in
more than 10 European countries. Bulgaria is
one of the few countries in East European region
that still hesitate to turn to flat tax rates. Looking
at the success of the other “flat” countries, even
the World Bank admits that the flat tax is better,
especially for Eastern Europe.
We believe that it is time now for Bulgaria to
“walk on water”!
Flat Tax Map 2007
Map design: Petar Ganev & Nikolay Minchev
Recently the World Bank published a
comprehensive survey ?Fiscal Policy and
Economic Growth: Lessons for Eastern Europe
and Central Asia?. The conclusion is simple:
?Flat-rate income tax reforms have generally
had positive effects in Eastern Europe, but need
to be complemented with additional steps to
modernize tax administration and reduce labor
taxation,???World Bank Senior Economist and
co-editor Tracey Lane.
The main lessons from the flat tax reforms in
ECA, pointed by the World Bank are as follows:
1) The key objectives of the reform should be
clearly articulated before turning to specific
design issues. In the rush to implement the
apparently successful reforms of other countries,
governments may overlook their core objectives.
There are different objectives for this type of
reform, such as improving compliance,
broadening the tax base, bringing simplicity to
the system, mobilizing higher or lower revenue,
reducing the tax burden in the country, and
shifting the tax burden from direct to indirect
taxation; some of these objectives run counter to
each other. Clear objectives should drive design
features, such as rates, allowances, tax credits,
and the like, as well as other parallel reforms
needed.
2) If revenue neutrality is one of the goals of the
reform, tax policy in other areas may need to be
adjusted as a safeguard against some drop in
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revenues in the PIT and CIT. If, in parallel,
another goal is to shift the burden away from
direct taxes and toward indirect taxes, tax policy
and administration for the VAT and excises
should be strengthened before or in tandem with
a flat income tax reform.
3) A comprehensive curtailment of income tax
loopholes and ad hoc exemptions is essential to
expand tax bases and prevent undue revenue loss
with flat income tax reforms. Countries that
closed loopholes and reduced exemptions had
greater success with simplification, compliance,
and revenue collection.
4) Success in expanding the PIT tax base and
improving PIT compliance depends in part on
complementary reforms in social insurance and
contributions. Payroll taxes have almost the
same base as the PIT in most countries in ECA,
and high marginal rates of payroll taxes (social
insurance contributions) can be a major obstacle
to improved PIT compliance after the reform.
5) Modernization of tax administration is a key
complementary institutional reform.
Simultaneous reforms in tax administration will
complement policy changes in helping in
achieve the goals of the reform (whatever they
may be) with fewer fiscal risks.
6) Allowances are critical to the achievement of
equity goals. Allowances have proven to be an
important safety net for lower-income taxpayers
and have enhanced the equity of flat tax reforms.
It is important to evaluate trade-offs carefully
and set allowances at appropriate thresholds.
Allowances should be kept simple, however, to
avoid administrative complexity.
7) The timing of the reform is critical.
Governments have been able to avoid
unmanageable revenue losses by implementing
tax reforms during times of strong growth and
sound fiscal frameworks.
Finally, communicating the reform, its goals,
and its characteristics, and obtaining consensus
from all stakeholders is important for success.
Informing the public is critical for PIT and CIT
reforms and can help to reduce political
obstacles. For the CIT, a highly publicized
campaign on the benefits of transparency and the
need to close loopholes can help counter
industry lobbyists who may argue against
elimination of exemptions for certain industries.
* Mart Laar ? Former Prime Minister of Estonia in
1992 ? 1994 and 1999 ? 2002
The e-government and the process of issuing
building permits
Metodi V. Metodiev
The idea behind E-government
According to official definition of World Bank
the E-government refers to the use by
government agencies of information
technologies (such as Wide Area Networks, the
Internet, and mobile computing) that have the
ability to transform relations with citizens,
businesses, and other arms of government. These
technologies can serve a variety of different
ends: better delivery of government services to
citizens, improved interactions with business and
industry, citizen empowerment through access to
information, or more efficient government
management. The resulting benefits can be less
corruption, increased transparency, greater
convenience, revenue growth, and/or cost
reductions.
The e-government is conceptual and technical
platform which is the fundament part of the
process of transition from traditional
administration services to truly electronic based
system of administrative services. This system
should improve the quality of public services
and establish efficient governance of
administrative services delivered by hi-end
systems of real-time communications.
Construction permits and e-government
In the Strategy of implementation of principals
of e-government in Bulgaria (adopted in 2002)
are stipulated 20 basic inter/intranet-based
services which should be provide to Bulgarian
citizens.
One of these 20 indicative services is “issuing
construction permit”. Unfortunately, at present
the readiness of this service is situated in level 1
(according to the numeration of  readiness –
level 1 means preparation phase and level 4
means fully integrated phase, so-called transition
phase). According to pre-scheduled working
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plan, at the end of 2005, this indicative service
had to be in phase 4 – transition. That mean the
people and state administration should have the
possibility to exchange information in real-time
trough the internet-based communication
platforms, but at the present time that is only
(science) fiction.
The construction industry is one of the leading
sectors of Bulgarian economy. The amount of
FDI in the industry for 2006 is 2, 1027 million
dollars. On the other hand the total amount of
final production in the construction industry
represent 15, 5 basic points from GDP of the
country.
At the same time, on the one hand the
administrative burden upon business and citizens
and on the other hand his effort to compliance
with current existing regulations in the process
of issuing building permits, these are the same
problems that face businesses and citizens which
are an obstacle to further development of the
construction industry.
The main question is how e-government could
help businesses and citizens struggling with the
burdensome and non transparent state
administration?
We can conclude that the principals of e-
government could transform the current situation
in two main directions:
· Increase efficiency of the state
administration
· Decrease the compliance costs and
bureaucracy in state administration
The question is: when and how this will be come
true? The answer is: who knows better than
government.
Bulgarian Statistics as a Tax
Metodi Lazarov
Generally speaking every economic activity
needs some empirical data so that past and
current trends could be analyzed in order to be
incorporated in future strategic plans. That is in
short the task of every analytical unit within a
bigger organization. The efficiency of this unit
proportionally transposes in a higher degree of
success of the organization itself. The quality of
services provided by the National Statistics
Institute (NSI), however, acts as a tax on all of
us and imposes unnecessary administrative
hindrances upon business.
The purchase of an ordinary statistical yearbook
together with a CD requires the waste of a
minimum of 20 minutes during some lazy
afternoon. Unintentionally one becomes a
witness of the sluggishness of the administration
that gets on one’s nerves while one is hopping
into different rooms till one finally receives the
product. Almost the same scenario repeats itself
when one requests the retrieval of electronic data
over Internet, the provision of which usually
prolongs beyond the agreed deadlines. The
efficiency of the institution might be good
enough according to its managers but NSI is still
in business only because of its status of state
agency, meaning bankruptcy in no cases because
of the stable financing from state subsidies. Any
other private company would have lost its clients
if it demonstrated the same organizational
behaviour – if one does not provide good
services, it gets eaten by the rivalry. It is a
indisputable fact that some of the economic
indicators, prepared by NSI, get ousted by more
reputable ones – good examples are real estate
and other sectors of the economy, that are
treated with special interest by investors to
whom any loss of time is crucial.
Our suggestions in tact with the principles of the
European Statistics Code of Practice:
· The organizational structure needs to be
reformulated in such a way that
managers are left with some space to
dispense employees and increase the
wages of others. That should increase
the efficiency of NSI (which is put in the
Code as number 10), because data
shows the number of employees is too
high in comparison to other Institutes in
Eastern Europe.
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· New working methods and valuable
know-how of other statistical institutes
need to be incorporated so that the
twelfth principle (reliability of official
data) is taken into consideration. Some
types of statistics from NSI are
practically useless because of their
inconsistence with reality. The
insufficient demand of such data could
at least hint at the managers to stop
research in these areas because other
players are providing better service.
That could save funds for the redesign
of the long obsolete website of NSI.
· The eleventh principle pleads for
practical applicability and public
worthiness of the activity of statistical
institutes. It is absolutely vital that NSI
introduces online payment system and
more convenient and quicker access to
any data. It is common for the statistics
institute in the EU to provide the greater
part of its data free of charge while NSI
requires payments for data, relevant to
all sectors in the economy. We are not
against NSI self-financing its activities
but not while it is being subsidized by
the state because we as consumers need
to pay twice for its services – direct
taxes and charges per each request.
The problem with national statistics is growing
while political will to solve this daily obstacle to
many companies continues to be lacking. The
Bulgarian economy is modernizing and
developing but NSI seems somehow behind that
rate of growth. It is probably sheer madness to
start a public debate about NSI being privatized
but that seems to be the only clear and effective
way out of the problem. The government needs
to bear in mind that state intervention even in
statistics causes loss of wealth.
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